Page:United States Reports, Volume 542.djvu/691

652 it assessed prejudice under a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than a reasonable probability standard.

We now grant the State's petition for a writ of certiorari and respondent's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and reverse.

The Sixth Circuit erred in ﬁnding the state court's application of Strickland unreasonable on the basis of evidence not properly before the state court. Although the state court had ventured that it would deny relief on the merits even taking Gooch's statement into account, its judgment also rested on the holding that the statement was not properly before it. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 86–89, 95–98. Granting relief in disregard of this independent basis for decision was error.

The "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1) applies when the "state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case." Williams v. Taylor,, 413 (2000). In this and related contexts we have made clear that whether a state court's decision was unreasonable must be assessed in light of the record the court had before it. See Yarborough v. Gentry,, 6 (2003) (per curiam) (denying relief where state court's application of federal law was "supported by the record"); Miller El v. Cockrell, , 348 (2003) (reasonableness of state court's factual finding assessed "in light of the record before the court"); cf. Bell v. Cone,, 697, n. 4 (2002) (declining to consider evidence not presented to state court in determining whether its decision was contrary to federal law).

Under the habeas statute, Gooch's statement could have been the subject of an evidentiary hearing by the District Court, but only if respondent was not at fault in failing to