Page:United States Reports, Volume 542.djvu/689

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 of this independent basis for decision was error, for the question whether a state court's decision was unreasonable must be assessed in light of the record before that court, see, e. g., Yarborough v. Gentry,, 6. Second, the Sixth Circuit erred in holding that the state court required proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The state court recited the correct reasonable probability standard, but the Sixth Circuit inferred from three subsequent passages in the state court's opinion that the state court had actually applied a preponderance standard. In doing so, the Sixth Circuit ignored § 2254(d)'s requirements that "state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt," Woodford v. Visciotti,, 24, and that "readiness to attribute error is inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow the law," ibid.

 

Respondent Jessie Jackson was tried in 1987 by the State of Tennessee for the murder of James Crawley. The State asserted that he had shot Crawley after an argument over drugs. Its principal evidence at trial was the eyewitness testimony of Jonathan Hughes, who claimed to have been at the scene with his girlfriend Melissa Gooch when the shooting occurred. Gooch did not testify. The jury convicted, and respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment.

After unsuccessfully moving for a new trial, respondent sought state postconviction relief, alleging, inter alia, that his trial counsel had been ineffective in failing to conduct an adequate investigation. See Strickland v. Washington,. The state court held an evidentiary hearing and then denied the petition, ﬁnding that counsel's performance was not deficient and that, in any event, respondent suffered no prejudice. Respondent then filed a "Motion for Hearing in Nature of Motion for New Trial," alleging newly discovered evidence. He claimed for the ﬁrst time—seven years after his conviction—that Gooch would now testify that, contrary to Hughes' trial testimony, she was not with 