Page:United States Reports, Volume 542.djvu/659

620 " given the facts of that case. Elstad, supra, at 308 (citing Michigan v. Tucker,, 445 (1974)).

In my view, Elstad was correct in its reasoning and its result. Elstad reﬂects a balanced and pragmatic approach to enforcement of the Miranda warning. An officer may not realize that a suspect is in custody and warnings are required. The officer may not plan to question the suspect or may be waiting for a more appropriate time. Skilled investigators often interview suspects multiple times, and good police work may involve referring to prior statements to test their veracity or to refresh recollection. In light of these realities it would be extravagant to treat the presence of one statement that cannot be admitted under Miranda as sufficient reason to prohibit subsequent statements preceded by a proper warning. See Elstad, 470 U.S., at 309 ("It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the warnings so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period"). That approach would serve "neither the general goal of deterring improper police conduct nor the Fifth Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy evidence would be served by suppression of the testimony." Id., at 308.

This case presents different considerations. The police used a two step questioning technique based on a deliberate violation of Miranda. The Miranda warning was withheld to obscure both the practical and legal significance of the admonition when ﬁnally given. As points out, the two step technique permits the accused to conclude that the right not to respond did not exist when the earlier incriminating statements were made. The strategy is based on the assumption that Miranda warnings will tend to mean less when recited midinterrogation, after inculpatory statements have already been obtained. This tactic relies on an intentional misrepresentation of the protection that