Page:United States Reports, Volume 542.djvu/658

Rh concerns of Miranda are not likely to be implicated and when other objectives of the criminal justice system are best served by its introduction. Thus, we have held that statements obtained in violation of the rule can be used for impeachment, so that the truth ﬁnding function of the trial is not distorted by the defense, see Harris v. New York, ; that there is an exception to protect counter vailing concerns of public safety, see New York v. Quarles, ; and that physical evidence obtained in reliance on statements taken in violation of the rule is admissible, see United States v. Patane, post, p. 630. These cases, in my view, are correct. They recognize that admission of evidence is proper when it would further important objectives without compromising Miranda ' s central concerns. Under these precedents, the scope of the Miranda suppression remedy depends on a consideration of those legitimate interests and on whether admission of the evidence under the circumstances would frustrate Miranda ' s central concerns and objectives.

Oregon v. Elstad,, reﬂects this approach. In Elstad, a suspect made an initial incriminating statement at his home. The suspect had not received a Miranda warning before making the statement, apparently because it was not clear whether the suspect was in custody at the time. The suspect was taken to the station house, where he received a proper warning, waived his Miranda rights, and made a second statement. He later argued that the postwarning statement should be suppressed because it was related to the unwarned ﬁrst statement, and likely induced or caused by it. The Court held that, although a Miranda violation made the first statement inadmissible, the postwarning statements could be introduced against the accused because "neither the general goal of deterring improper police conduct nor the Fifth Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy evidence would be served by