Page:United States Reports, Volume 542.djvu/647

608 surrounding admissibility of confessions in state cases had become exceedingly exacting, reflecting all the policies embedded in the privilege" against self incrimination. Miranda, 384 U.S., at 464.

In Miranda, we explained that the "voluntariness doctrine in the state cases encompasses all interrogation practices which are likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him from making a free and rational choice," id., at 464–465. We appreciated the difficulty of judicial enquiry post hoc into the circumstances of a police interrogation, Dickerson v. United States,, 444 (2000), and recognized that "the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation blurs the line between voluntary and involuntary statements, and thus heightens the risk" that the privilege against self incrimination will not be observed, id., at 435. Hence our concern that the "traditional totality of the circumstances" test posed an unacceptably great" risk that involuntary custodial confessions would escape detection. Id., at 442.

Accordingly, "to reduce the risk of a coerced confession and to implement the Self Incrimination Clause," Chavez v. Martinez,, 790 (2003) (, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), this Court in Miranda concluded that "the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored," 384 U.S., at 467. Miranda conditioned the admissibility at trial of any custodial confession on warning a suspect of his rights: failure to give the prescribed warnings and obtain a waiver of rights before custodial questioning generally requires exclusion of any statements obtained. Conversely, giving the warnings and getting a