Page:United States Reports, Volume 542.djvu/209

170 for Petitioners 13; see also Den Norske, 241 F.3d, at 429 ("[W]e have found no case in which jurisdiction was found in a case like this—where a foreign plaintiff is injured in a foreign market with no injuries arising from the anticompetitive effect on a United States market"). And respondents themselves apparently conceded as much at a May 23, 2001, hearing before the District Court below. 2001 WL 761360, at *4.

Nevertheless, respondents now have called to our attention six cases, three decided by this Court and three decided by lower courts. In the first three cases the defendants included both American companies and foreign companies jointly engaged in anticompetitive behavior having both foreign and domestic effects. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,, 595 (1951) (agreements among American, British, and French corporations to eliminate competition in the manufacture and sale of antifriction bearings in world, including United States, markets); United States v. National Lead Co., , 325–328 (1947) (international cartels with American and foreign members, restraining international commerce, including United States commerce, in titanium pigments); United States v. American Tobacco Co., , 171–172 (1911) (American tobacco corporations agreed in England with British company to divide world markets). In all three cases the plaintiff sought relief, including relief that might have helped to protect those injured abroad.

In all three cases, however, the plaintiff was the Government of the United States. A Government plaintiff, unlike a private plaintiff, must seek to obtain the relief necessary to protect the public from further anticompetitive conduct and to redress anticompetitive harm. And a Government plaintiff has legal authority broad enough to allow it to carry out this mission. 15 U.S.C. § 25; see also, e. g., United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,, 334 (1961) ("[I]t is well settled that once the Government has