Page:United States Reports, Volume 542.djvu/121

82 "a reasonable probability that, but for [the error claimed], the result of the proceeding would have been different." United States v. Bagley,, 682 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (adopting the prejudice standard of Strickland v. Washginton, , 694 (1984), for claims under Brady v. Maryland, (internal quotation marks omitted)); 473 U.S., at 685 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (same). No reason has appeared for treating the phrase "affecting substantial rights" as untethered to a prejudice requirement when applying Olano to this nonstructural error, or for doubting that Bagley is a sensible model to follow. As Vonn makes clear, the burden of establishing entitlement to relief for plain error is on the defendant claiming it, and for several reasons, we think that burden should not be too easy for defendants in Dominguez's position. First, the standard should enforce the policies that underpin Rule 52(b) generally, to encourage timely objections and reduce wasteful reversals by demanding strenuous exertion to get relief for unpreserved error. See Vonn, 535 U.S., at 73. Second, it should respect the particular importance of the ﬁnality of guilty pleas, which usually rest, after all, on a defendant's