Page:United States Reports, Volume 209.djvu/88

 62 OCTOBER TERM, 1907. Argument for Petitionera  U.S. Ry. Co., 48 Hun, 496, 500; Chicaqo &c. R. Co. v. Chicago &c. Coal Co., 79 Illinois, 121, 126; 4tlanta, K. & N. R. Co. v. Horne, 106 Tennessee, 73; S. C. 59 S. W. Rep. 134, 135. Having made the contract in accordance with the schedule, it was the duty of the carrier to keep such schedule in foroe and to carry for all others at the same rate. Hence, them was no right to change the tariff during the life of the contract. Such was the effect of the contract. Laurel Cotton Mills v. Crul! &c. R. Cb., 84 Mississippi, 339. The indictment was insufficient. The indictment' omitted the statutory words, "whereby property . . . by any dev/ce  be transported at a less rate. ." Not only this, but it wholly failed to state how, in what manner, or by what means the concession was obtained, or of what it consisted. In a statutory offense, them cannot be any omis- sion of any element of the offense as defined; and, the indict- ment must show the means by or the manner in which the offense was committed. Even in statutory offenses of the character in question, them is an exception to the general rule that it is sufficient to charge the offense in the language of the statute. United States v. Cook, 17 Wall. 168; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542; United States v. Mann, 95 U.S. 583; United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483; Evans v. United States, 153 U.S. 584; United States v. Brazean, 78 Fed. Rep. 464, 465, and cases cited; Evans v. United States, 153 U.S. 584; Keck v, United States, 172 U.S. 434; United States v. Britton, 107 U.S. 655, 669. The facts (lid not waxrant a finding of any .criminal guilt. Nothing in the record warrants any imputation of bad faith. It can well be contended that the element of willfulness in the former law must be extended to the Elkins Act. Another principle leads to exactly the same result. In the Federal courts even if a statute does not use the words "willfully or intentionally" or make se/ent necessary, still the statute will be construed to mean that there must have been knowl- edge of wrongdoing and actual guilty intent, unless, pamibly,

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