Page:United States Reports, Volume 209.djvu/77

 O'REILLY n. CAMARA v. BROOKE. 9 U.S. Openloner the Court. Kent, 454; Stat. Westm. II, c. 25; 2 Co. Inst. 412; U.S. Rev. Stat. �3, el. 13. If we are to apply that conception to the ce, we are led to ask why the disseisin was not complete, upon the allegations of the complaint, before General Brooke had anything to do with the matter, or why the brief period during which his authority intervened should make him an- swerable not only for what had happened before, but also for the continued exclusion of the plaintiff by the United States and by the government of Cuba. But it is very hard to admit that the notion of a d'mseisin can be applied for the present purpose to such disembodied rights any more than to copy- rights or patents; and, if not, then all that General Brooke could be held for, if for anything, would be damages for the dis- turbance of the plaintiff while he was in power, which are not the object of this suit. It becomes impossible to go further than that when it is remembered that the United States asserted no permanent sovereignty over Cuba, and that, as General Brooke could not carry the office with him, his interference must have lust al! legal effect in a very short time. Again, if the plaintiff 1ot her rights once for all by General Breoke's order, 'and so was disscised, it would be a question to be considered whether a disseisin was a tort within the mean- ing of Rev. Stat. �3 (16). In any event, the question hardly can be avoided whether the supposed tort is "a tort only in violation of the law of nations" or of the Treaty with Spain. In this court the plaintiff seems to place more reliance upon the suggestion that her rights were of so fundamental a nature that they could not be displaced, even if Congress and the Executive should unite in the effort. It is not necessary to say more about that contention than that it is not the ground on which the jurisdiction of the District Court was invoked. Coming one step further down, we are met by an argument on the part of the defendant that the only things that we can consider are the pleadings and the judgment dismissing the complaint. It is urged with great force that the decision deny- ing the power of a circuit judge to find and report facts for the

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