Page:United States Reports, Volume 209.djvu/221

 209 U. . H,.., J., dissenting. ferred to, in which the doctrines of In re Alls were reaffirmed and applied. We may refer in this connection to Gunt v. Atlantic Cooer L/n, 200 U.S. 273, 291, in which case one of the points made was that the Circuit Court of the United States had no power to restrain the Attorney General of South Carolina and the counsel associated with him from prosecuting in the state courts actions authorized by the laws of the State, and hence �that the court erred in awarding an initruction against said officers. This court said: "S9pport for the proportion is rested upon the terms of the Eleventh Amendment and the provisions of section 720 of the lqevised Statutes, forbidding the granting of a writ by any court of the United States to stay proceedin$s in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any jaw relating to proceedings .in bankruptcy. The soundne of the doctrine relied upon is undoubted. In.re Ayre, 123 U.S. 443; F/tas v. MeGbee, 172 U.S. 516. The difficulty is that the doctrine is inapplicable to this case. Section 729 of the Revised Stat- utes was orionally adopted in 1793, whilst the Eleventh Amendment was in process of formation in Congress for sub- mission to the States, and long, therefore, before the ratifica- tion of that Amendment. The restrictions embodied in the section were, therefore, but a partial accomplishment of the more comprehensive result affectuated by the prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment. Both the statute and the Amend- ment relate to the power of courts of the United States to deal, against the will and consent of a State, with controversies between it and indiiduais. None of the prohibitions, there- fore, of the Amendment or of the statute relate to the power Of a Federal court to administer relief in causes where juris- 'diction as to a State and its officers has been acquired a a varult ol the voluntary action ol the State in subm',ming its rights to ]ud/eq/determinat/on. To confound the two classes of eases is but to overlook the distinction which exists between the power of a court to deal with a subject over which it has

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