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suspicions of partiality, being thereby obviated. Because, in cases where some citizens of one State have demands against all the citizens of another State, the cause of liberty and the rights of men forbid, that the latter should be the sole judges of the justice due to the latter; and true Republican Government requires that free and equal citizens should have free, fair, and equal justice. 9th. To controversies between citizens of the same State, claiming lands under grants of different States; because, as the rights of the two States to grant the land, are drawn into question, neither of the two States ought to decide the controversy. 10th. To controversies between a State, or the citizens thereof; and foreign States, citizens or subjects; because, as every nation is responsible for the conduct of its citizens towards other nations; all questions touching the justice due to foreign nations, or people, ought to be ascertained by, and depend on national authority. Even this cursory view of the judicial powers of the United States, leaves the mind strongly impressed with the importance of them to the preservation of the tranquillity, the equal sovereignty, and the equal right of the people.

The question now before us renders it necessary to pay particular attention to that part of the 2d section, which extends the judicial power “to controversies between a state and citizens of another state.” It is contended, that this ought to be construed to reach none of these controversies, excepting those in which a State may be Plaintiff. The ordinary rules for construction will easily decide whether those words are to be understood in that limited sense.

This extension of power is remedial, because it is to settle controversies. It is therefore, to be construed liberally. It is politic, wise, and good, that, not only the controversies, in which a State is Plaintiff but also those in which a State is Defendant, should be settled; both cases, therefore, are within the reason of the remedy; and ought to be so adjudged, unless the obvious, plain, and literal sense of the words forbid it. If we attend to the words, we find them to be express, positive, free from ambiguity, and without room for such implied expressions: “The judicial power of the United States shall extend to controversies between a state and citizens of another state.” If the Constitution really meant to extend these powers only to those controversies in which a State might be Plaintiff, to the exclusion of those in which citizens had demands against a State, it is inconceivable that it should have attempted to convey that meaning in words, not only so incompetent, but also repugnant to it; if it meant to exclude a certain class of these controversies, why were they not expressly excepted; on the contrary, not even intimation of such intention appears in any