Page:United States Reports, Volume 1.djvu/90

 Rh cae in the tar-chamber, and is the cae in this court, there it is from the purchae of the writ—To this purpoe he Hence it was concluded that if proces againt an ambaador be null and void, , hall it be void if iued againt a overeign.

That the true reaon of the miniter’s exemption from proces is the independence and overeignty of the peron he repreents. And although by engaging in trade, he may o far divet himelf of his public character, as to ubject thee goods to attachment, yet in every cae where he repreents his mater, his property is acred. But a overeign cannot ubject himelf by implication: he mut do it expresly.

That though the goods of a overeign, as well as of an individual, might be liable for freight, or duties, or ubject to forfeiture; yet in thoe caes, there was a lien on the goods, they were anwerable, and the proces was : in this cae, it was ; and the goods were attached merely to compel the party’s appearance to anwer the plaintiff’s demand. And no overeign would ubmit to the indignity of doing this.

Hence it was inferred that the writ was a mere nullity.

II. Upon the econd point, authorities were read to explain the cae produced by the plaintiff’s council, and to hew a ditinction between an erroneous and a void writ. That the heriff was bound to execute and return the writ, although erroneous, if the court had juridiction. But when the court had no juridiction, the writ was void, and the heriff was a trepaer if he dared to obey it; a void authority being the ame as none. That in England, the heriffs were never obliged to return a writ, if upon howing caue, it appeared that the defendant was a public miniter, or one of his dometics. 5 Bac. 431. Salk. 700. 2 Barnes. 1 Wils. 20.

That uppreing the writ was not making the heriff judge, becaue he was obliged to aign a reaon for o doing: and on the legality of that reaon the court was now to determine.

He added, that if the heriff had attached the goods, he was liable to punihment, and to compel him to return his proceedings, was to oblige him to put his offence upon record, and to furnih tetimony againt himelf.

He finally oberved, that the writ was void, or it was not. If void, the heriff need pay no attention to it: if not void, he was obliged to execute it at all events; and if o, thee inconveniencies would follow. That any diaffected peron, who happened to be a creditor of the United States, might injure our public defence, and retard or ruin the operations of a campaign; that he might iue an attachment againt the cannon of General Wahington, or eize the public money deigned for the payment of his army. That the tates united or everal, would never ubmit to put in pecial bail (which mut be done to prevent judgment) and to anwer before the tribunal of a iter tate.

That the plaintiff was under no peculiar inconvenience. Every creditor of this tate or of the United States lay under the ame. If his demand was jut, Virginia would, upon application, do what was right; if not, and flagrant injutice was done him, he might (if a ubject of this tate, and entitled to its protection) complain to the executive power of Pennylvania.

He concluded with oberving on the importance of uppreing uch meaures as the preent, at their firt appearance, and of preerving the rights of overeign tates inviolate—and prayed that the rule might be dicharged.

The counel for the plaintiff inited, that though Virginia was a overeign tate, yet this ought not to exempt her property in every cae from the laws and juridiction of another tate. That overeignty hould never be made a plea in bar of jutice: and that the true idea of prerogative, was the power of doing good, and not, as it had ometimes been expreed, “the divine right of doing ill.”

That every peron, and all property within this tate, was ubject to its juridiction, by o being within it, except a overeign power, and the repreentative of a overeign power, with his dometics and effects, which he holds as repreentative.

That if an ambaador engages in trade, his property o engaged is liable to attachment, Vat B. IV ect. 114. and if a overeign tate turns merchant, and draws or accepts bills of exchange, its property ought in like manner to be ubject cited

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