Page:United States Reports, Volume 1.djvu/410

Rh1788. by the proper tribunal, it is a protection every where elſe: And theſe exceptions take place in conſidering the queſtion as between nations totally independent and unconnected. It is true, that the American States have hitherto been held by a very ſlight confederacy; but what remedy is to be purſued? Shall we, if the knot is looſe, make it ſtill looſer? If the union is weak, ſhall we encreaſe the debility? Or, when a more perfect conſolidation is eſſential to the national exiſtence, ſhall we employ repulſion inſtead of attraction, and thus widen the inconvenient and ruinous diſtance between the different members of our political body? Neither reaſon or experience would juſtify ſuch a conſtruction; and the United States, though individually ſovereign and independent, muſt admit, not only the voluntary law of nations, but a peculiar law reſulting from their relative ſituation.

No caſes can be more diſtinguiſhable then the preſent, and that in which the rule for reviving rights and credits at the expiration of a war occurs. There is no doubt, that, on the declaration of peace, a Britiſh ſubject could ſue here; and, we find, that although our government conceived that they might act as they thought proper with reſpect to the citizens of the State, yet the inſtalment laws were never extended to obſtruct and protract the recovery of debts due to foreigners. If, therefore, Camp is to be conſidered in the honorable light of an open enemy, the argument for the Defendant is unfounded: but, when it is recollected, that he did not avow his ſentiments on the declaration of Independence; and that, nevertheleſs, he remained in the enjoyment of his property under the law of Connecticut for ſome time afterwards, it is impoſſible to regard him in any other light than that of a ſubject, and ſubjects are the objects of the municipal law, not of the law of nations. In the caſe of RespublicaReſpublica [sic] v. Chapman on an indictment for treaſon (See ant. 53.) The Defendant was acquitted, becauſe, in the opinion of the Court, he was not a ſubject: If he had been a ſubject, he muſt have been attainted; and being ſo attainted, he could never have claimed any advantage from the law of nations on the return of Peace. Thus, with reſpect to Camp, he was a Traitor; the proceedings under the Act of Connecticut produced a forfeiture and attainder; and the right of action was as excluſively veſted in the State (and by the power of that State alone can it be diveſted) as if he had been taken and executed. The Act, indeed, does not ſpeak at all of an enemy, but of ſuch perſons as were reſident in Connecticut, and had joined the Britiſh troops; for proceedings of this kind are never carried on againſt an open enemy. The profits of his property may be ſequeſtered during the war, in order to prevent their being remitted, but no forfeiture can take place.

If then Camp was a ſubject of Connecticut, he derives no right from the Treaty of Peace; for, Great-Britain could not mean to interfere between that State and her own citizens. The deſcription in the fourth Article cannot be extended to him, and though the