Page:United States Reports, Volume 1.djvu/302

Rh 

1788.

to the Supreme Court in Philadelphia, in Sect. 4. plainly fuppofes the caufes to be fuch as are inftituted by Capias, Summons, Attachments, Scire ƒcias, Partition, or Dower ; all which modes are particularly fpecified ; and it certainly holds forth no idea to prevent an amicable fuit being entered, or a Judgment being confeffed, by a fpecial warrant of attorney, as in the prefent cafe. It was natural to fpecify the Common Pleas of Buck county, becaufe the parties lived in Bucks, and the eftate upon which the mortgage was given, lay in that county ; but it was certainly in the power of the Obligor fo give authority to enter Judgment in any Court within the United States–from the nature of the contract it muft be prefumed that he intended to do fo, as well as from the terms of the warrant, which authorize the entering the Judgment in an Court in America;  and, agreeably to the eftablifhed practice and interpretation of fuch warrants of Attorney, the Judgment has been confeffed in the Supreme Court.

The delivered the unanimous Judgment of the Court.

M‘KEAN, Chieƒ Juʃtice. – We are happy that this caufe has come before us fo recently after the paffing of the act of Affembly ; as, by on early fettlement of the practice, much uncertainty and litigation may be avoided.

There are two grounds upon which, we are clearly of opinion, this Judgment ought to be fet afide. The firʃt is, that though it has been entered, in purfuance of a warrant of Attorney, after the paffing of the law, yet the Bond is oƒ a prior date ;  and we find it exprefsly enacted, ‘‘ that no fuit of action fhall be commenced in the ‘‘ faid Supreme Court ƒor any debt or cauʃe which ariƒe BEFORE the ‘‘paƒƒing oƒ this act,  except fuits of the Commonwealth, and fuch  ‘‘wherein the title of land, or other real eftate, may come in ‘‘ queftion.’’  For this reafon, therefore, we think that the Judgment could not have been entered up, even in the county oƒ Philadelphia.

But, in the ʃecond place, whatever doubts may formerly have been entertained, it is certain that, aƒter the 2d oƒ January 1787, the original juriƒdiction of the Supreme Court is, by the 4th Section of the fame act, reftricted to the county oƒ Philadelphia ;  and this Judgment being entered, at a fubfequent period, in the Supreme Court as of the county of Bucks,  there can be  no doubt, that the proceedings are, likewife, on that account, erroneous and irregular.

The intention of the Legiflature was, evidently, to prohibit the entering up Judgment on bonds &c, by virtue of warrants of Attorney in that Court, which fhould affect the lands of the party in any other county than Philadelphia ; and the confequences would be fo injurious, that even if we could, we ought not to admit a different conftruction of the act. For, if one Judgment were entered in 'Waʃhington county, and another here, on the ʃame day, by what principle could we determine, which of thofe Judgments had the prior line? The queftion would be productive of great perplexity in the Rh