Page:United States Army Field Manual 3-13 Information Operations.djvu/50

 FM 3-18 considerations (ME'1'T—TC). However, tho G-7 rotains primary st.a.t`f1esp¢>nsi- bility and oversight. 2-94. Good policies and actions taken by a military throw:. tho government, or multinational partners may produce adverse efibuts. When American Lroops deploy nvursons, their presence can create problems. For example, ono ibreign humanitarian amsistzmce operation created economic hardships for the civil population in the AO, even though the mission was to build schools and hos pitals. Local leaders complained that the force bought all the construction materials in the area, which dmve up prices. Local businessmen complained that Americans were signing contracts and working with minority and small businesses rather than with them. In situations like this, opposing attitudes and beliefs can create an image of the force that nuiliiies its success, if not de- tected and addressed quickly. Normally, PSYDP units create the image of the ibme with support fmm the PA and CMO. 2»95. Cuuntcring information disseminated within the United States is not Lbs armed forces responsibility. Countering information directed towards strategic audiences [essential leaders, oflficials, and agencies) remains the re- sponsibility of the State Department and the International Broadcasting Board. Commanders coordinate counterpropaganda activities through PSYOP channels and the geographic combaiant command IO cell. However, strategic countorpropaganda is normally conducted `tvy the State Department and coordinated by the Joint Chlois of Staff through the International Public information Committee. Contributions 2-96. Counterpropaganda reduces the ability of adversary propaganda to iniluence friendly forces and others in the AO. It attacks adversary propa- ganda. 2-97, Countorpropagauda includes preventive actions, wunteractions, and rumor control. Preventive actions take the form of propaganda awareness programs. These programs inform US and multinational forces. and iriendly populations about the nature of hostile propaganda. Counteractions are measures that PSYOP units take to ieduce or neutralize the etfects of hostile propaganda, Rumors are a means of propaganda by based on widely dissemi- nated talk or opinion. They have no discemable source and no known authority. Rumor control soeks m counter rumors that are unfavorable to U.S interests. 2~SB. Failure to counter adversary propaganda can produce many eH'ects. These range from simple confusion to disrupting ongoing operadons. Com- mon ei‘l`o¢:ts of hostile propaganda, misinformation, and disinfurmntion, in~ clock? • Prompting neutral parties to resist or not support military operations. • increasing adversary wiil to resist by fhnning hatreds, biases, and predispositions. • Loading multinational partners to question their roles in n coalition. • Intiting riots. · Causing refugees tn block lines of communication. 2-20