Page:United States Army Field Manual 3-13 Information Operations.djvu/49

 Infomation Bpuniunns Elnmsnts and Rntamt Auivitin Prom ax noupoliticnl or ncumilitary target. The target of this information can be anyone. Misinformatiou is often best countered by either ignoring it altogether or disseminating the truth. However, uven providing the facts can consume rewinees and time, and may not be worth the etlfort. In some situa- tions, the credibility of the military is pitted against a credible news agency, and there may be no clear winner. 'l’lierefore, it is often best to be open and objective when faced with possible misinformation. A cooperative relationship between the military PA stat? and the media may help counter the effects of misinformation. 2-B9. Disinfarmation is information disseminated primarily by invelligence organizations or other covert agencies designed bo dis· tort information, or deceive or influence United States decisionmak- ers, United States forces. coalition allies, key actors, or individuals by indirect or unconventional means. It is a form of propaganda directed toward rlecisionmakers to uontuse them into making incorrect decisions. At the tactical level disinnirmation can lead commanders to expend resources vo guard against nonexistent tlxmats. Disinawrmotion can cause rifts in coali- tions by playing oi? historical ethnic, raoiol, and cultural biases of coalition partners. Adversaries can direct disinformatinn indirectly, such as through tl1lmi—pa1·ty communications broadcasts. They may also use unconventional tneanst such as notices on txnnmonuse items like matcliboxes or novelty gifts. ZYHO. Opposing information is intentional or unintentional truth- based informatlon from any source that represents an opposing view. It is usually diroomd against Llie US military, allius or multinational partners, and key audiences within tho A0. However, it may be diiuctcd at adversaries, potential adversaries, or uonnligmzd parties. Opposing inlkmiiation roquims US dnuisionmaknrs to unrlm·st:ind the utfects US forces produce in an AO, and act to minimize negative images of US policy and operations and amplify positive imazes. 2—9l. Countering propaganda in a foreign AO is usually the ¤espoosibiLity of PSYOP units. Other government agencies counter propaganda outside the A0, Often, PSYOP forces depend on the information networks of allies or multinational partners to counter propaganda within their border:. However, PSYOP ibmes may provide assistance when requested. 2-92. The ideal eounterpropagxmda plan incorporates efforts of a loose net~ work of organizations and agencies. lt often provides common themes and objectives. All I0 elements support oounterpmpaganda plans, but PSYOP Races usually conduct uountorpropaganda operations. 2-93. Adversaries, potential adversaries, and the other groups use propa» gancla, misinformation, und disinllirmation to influence public opinion, the international media, and friendly decisionmakors. Commanders use counter- propaganda to provide targeted audiences with nn alternative iowrmotion source. Counterprtvpaganda preempts, prevents, and disrupts advcrsaiy ef- forts to disseminate propaganda, misinkvrmation, and disintormation. At the tactical and operational levels, the focal point for oountcrpropaganda may vary, based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available and civil 249