Page:US Senate Report on CIA Detention Interrogation Program.pdf/99

UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET////NOFORN cell. Over a period of years, al-Nashiri accused the CIA staff of drugging or poisoning his food, and complained of bodily pain and insomnia. At one point, al-Nashiri launched a short-lived hunger strike that resulted in the CIA force feeding him rectally.

( TS////NF ) In October 2004, 21 months after the final documented use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri, an assessment by CIA contract interrogator DUNBAR and another CIA interrogator concluded that al-Nashiri provided "essentially no actionable information," and that "the probability that he has much more to contribute is low." Over the course of al-Nashiri's detention and interrogation by the CIA, the CIA disseminated 145 intelligence reports based on his debriefings. Al-Nashiri provided information on past operational plotting, associates whom he expected to participate in plots, details on completed operations, and background on al-Qa'ida's structure and methods of operation. Al-Nashiri did not provide the information that the CIA's ALEC Station sought and believed al-Nashiri possessed, specifically "perishable threat information to help [CIA] thwart future attacks and capture additional operatives."

E. Tensions with Country Relating to the CIA Detention Facility and the Arrival of New Detainees
( TS////NF ) According to CIA records, three weeks after  and political leadership of Country  agreed to host a CIA detention facility, the CIA informed the U.S. ambassador, because, as was noted in a cable, by not doing so, the CIA was TOP SECRET////NOFORN Page 73 of 499

UNCLASSIFIED