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UNCLASSIFIED "[a]ny data collected by them from detainees with whom they previously interacted as interrogators will always be suspect." OMS then informed the management of the Renditions Group that "no professional in the field would credit [SWIGERT and DUNBAR's] later judgments as psychologists assessing the subjects of their enhanced measures." At the end of their deployment, in June 2003, SWIGERT and DUNBAR provided their assessment of KSM and recommended that he should be evaluated on a monthly basis by "an experienced interrogator known to him" who would assess how forthcoming he is and "remind him that there are differing consequences for cooperating or not cooperating." In his response to the draft Inspector General Special Review, OMS noted that "OMS concerns about conflict of interest… were nowhere more graphic than in the setting in which the same individuals applied an EIT which only they were approved to employ, judged both its effectiveness and detainee resilience, and implicitly proposed continued use of the technique – at a daily compensation reported to be $1800/day, or four times that of interrogators who could not use the technique."


 * D. The Detention and Interrogation of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri


 * 1. CIA Interrogators Disagree with CIA Headquarters About Al-Nashiri's Level of Cooperation; Interrogators Oppose Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

(TS////NF) 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, assessed by the CIA to be an al-Qa'ida "terrorist operations planner" who was "intimately involved" in planning both the USS Cole bombing and the 1998 East Africa U.S. Embassy bombings, was captured in the United Arab Emirates in mid-October 2002. He provided information while in the custody of a foreign government, including on plotting in the Persian Gulf, and was then rendered by the Page 66 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED