Page:US Senate Report on CIA Detention Interrogation Program.pdf/81

UNCLASSIFIED from having been forced to sit on the bare concrete floor without pants. [CIA OFFICER 1's] initial cable to CIA Headquarters on Rahman's death included a number of misstatements and omissions that were not discovered until internal investigations into Rahman's death.

(TS////NF) The death of Gul Rahman resulted in increased attention to CIA detention and interrogation activities in Country by CIA Headquarters. The CTC formally designated the CTC's Renditions Group as the responsible entity for the management and maintenance of all CIA interrogation facilities, including DETENTION SITE COBALT, in early December 2002. Despite this change, many of the same individuals within the CIA—including DUNBAR, officers at DETENTION SITE COBALT, and officers within ALEC Station who had recommended the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul Rahman—remained key figures in the CIA interrogation program and received no reprimand or sanction for Rahman's death. Instead, in March 2003, just four months after the death of Gul Rahman, the CIA Station in Country recommended that  [CIA OFFICER 1] receive a "cash award" of $2,500 for his "consistently superior work." [CIA OFFICER 1] remained in his position as manager of the detention site until July 2003 and continued to be involved in the interrogations of other CIA detainees. He was formally certified as a CIA interrogator in April 2003 after the practical portion of his training requirement was waived because of his past experience with interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT. DIRECTOR. In late 2005, the CIA convened an Accountability Board to review the actions of CIA personnel in Gul Rahman's death. The board recommended that the executive director "impose a 10 day suspension without pay" on CIA OFFICER 1], and noted that this action would "strike the appropriate balance between: 1) the fact that [ (CIA OFFICER 1]] was the only individual who made decisions that led directly, albeit unintentionally, to Rahman's death, and 2) the significant weight the Board attached to the mitigating factors at play in this incident." (See Memorandum for Executive Director from, Deputy Director for Science and Technology, re: Report and Recommendations of the Special Accountability Board Regarding the Death of Afghan detainee Gul Rahman.) On February 10, 2006, however, the CIA Executive Director K.B. Foggo notified  [CIA OFFICER 1] that he intended to take no disciplinary action against him. In his memo describing that decision, the executive director stated: "While not condoning your actions, it is imperative, in my view, that they… be judged within the operational context that existed at the time of Rahman's detention. Cable traffic reviewed by the board shows conclusively that Headquarters generally was aware of, and posed no objections to, the confinement conditions and interrogation techniques being imposed on Rahman as late as November. On that date, Headquarters notified [the CIA Station in COUNTRY ]… that it was 'motivated to extract any and all operational information' from Rahman, that it rated achieving Rahman's cooperation to be of 'great importance' and that it acknowledged that Rahman 'may need to be subjected to enhanced interrogation measures to induce him to comply." (See February 10, 2006, Memorandum for [ [CIA OFFICER 1]], CounterTerrorist Center, National Clandestine Service, from Executive Director, re; "Accountability Decision.") With regard to the death of Gul Rahman, the CIA's June 2013 Response states: "Most egregiously, we believe that CIA leaders erred in not holding anyone formally accountable for the actions and failure of management related to the death of Gul Rahman at [COBALT] in 2002. We understand the reasoning underlying CIA management's decision to overturn an accountability board recommendation that would have imposed sanctions on the least Page 55 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED