Page:US Senate Report on CIA Detention Interrogation Program.pdf/78

UNCLASSIFIED the. A cable followed on July 16, 2002, to the CIA Station in Country suggesting possible interrogation techniques to use against Ridha al-Najjar, including:


 * utilizing "Najjar's fear for the well-being of his family to our benefit," with the cable explicitly stating that interrogators could not "threaten his family with imminent death";


 * using "vague threats" to create a "mind virus" that would cause al-Najjar to believe that his situation would continue to get worse until he cooperated;


 * manipulating Ridha al-Najjar's environment using a hood, restraints, and music; and


 * employing sleep deprivation through the use of round-the-clock interrogations.

(TS////NF) The cable went on to note that the "possibility that [al-Najjar] may have current threat or lead information demands that we keep up the pressure on him." With the exception of a brief mention of "diminished returns from the most recent interviews of al-Najjar," and references to the detainee's complaints about physical ailments, the cable offers no evidence al-Najjar was actively resisting CIA interrogators.

(TS////NF) Ten days later, on July 26, 2002, CIA officers in Country, none of whom had been trained in the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, proposed putting al-Najjar in isolation and using "sound disorientation techniques," "sense of time deprivation," limited light, cold temperatures, and sleep deprivation. The CIA officers added that they felt they had a "reasonable chance of breaking Najjar" to get "the intelligence and locator lead information on UBL and Bin Ladin's family." The plan for al-Najjar was circulated to senior CIA officers as part of the Daily DCI Operations Update. Page 52 of 499 UNCLASSIFIED