Page:US Senate Report on CIA Detention Interrogation Program.pdf/104

UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET////NOFORN plans typically made no reference to the information the interrogators sought and why the detainees was believed to possess the information.

3. CIA Headquarters Urges Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Despite Interrogators' Assessment That Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Was Cooperative
( TS////NF ) When CIA interrogators at DETENTION SITE BLUE assessed that bin al-Shibh was cooperative and did not have additional knowledge of future attacks, CIA Headquarters disagreed and instructed the interrogators to continue using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, which failed to elicit the information sought by CIA Headquarters. On February 11, 2003, interrogators asked CIA Headquarters for questions that ALEC Station was "85 percent certain [bin al-Shibh ] will be able to answer," in order to verify bin al-Shibh's level of cooperation. The interrogators stated that information from Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri suggested that bin al-Shibh would not have been given a new assignment or trusted with significant information given his high-profile links to the September 11, 2001, attacks. They further stated that bin al-Shibh had "achieved substantial notoriety after 11 September," but was still unproven in al-Qa'ida circles and may have "been privy to information more as a bystander than as an active participant."

( TS////NF ) The CIA's ALEC Station disagreed with the assessment of the detention site personnel, responding that it did not believe the portrayals of bin al-Shibh offered by Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri were accurate and that CIA Headquarters assessed that bin al-Shibh must have actionable information due to his proximity to KSM and CIA Headquarters' belief that bin al-Shibh had a history of withholding information from interrogators. ALEC Station wrote:

"'As base [DETENTION SITE BLUE] is well aware, Ramzi had long been deliberately withholding and/or providing misleading information to his interrogators in [a foreign government].... From our optic, it is imperative to focus Ramzi exclusively on two issues: 1) What are the next attacks planned for the US and 2) Who and where are the operatives inside the United States.'" TOP SECRET////NOFORN Page 78 of 499

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