Page:US Dept. of State - Documents on the Nicaraguan Resistance (1986).pdf/4

 to a democratic outcome for that country. The people of Nicaragua and the resistance forces are struggling for a future of freedom and peace, and they deserve our support.

Sincerely,  Document 2

Letter from Senator Claiborne Pell (R.I.), Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to Assistant Secretary Abrams, March 4, 1986

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This regards your recent letter to Senator Lugar commenting on the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus' report of last April, entitled "Who Are the Contras?" As you may know, I have been interested in receiving information from the Department on the make-up of the military leadership of the FDN. I am encouraged that the Department is now addressing the issue, and agree that it is a legitimate and important topic of debate.

I am interested to read in your report that, although you dispute certain of the Caucus' conclusions, you do confirm its staff's finding of last spring that there is substantial involvement in the FDN military leadership of ex-National Guardsmen. Specifically, you determine—as indeed did its staff—that over 40 of the FDN command were formerly members of Somoza's National Guard.

I am disturbed, however, that your report is both incomplete and at times inconsistent with past assertions of your Administration.

It is incomplete because it fails to include the names, titles or backgrounds of any military leader other than Enrique Bermudez, thus precluding the Caucus' staff and other analysts from verifying its conclusions. And it is inconsistent in that it appears directly to contradict at least one key finding of your predecessor, Langhorne Motley: last spring, he confirmed that nine of ten of the FDN General Staff were ex-Guardsmen; in contrast, your report neglects so much as to mention a General Staff. In addition, it greatly expands Ambassador Motley's definition of military leadership well past the command level to include lower-ranking "civil-military" personnel and task force deputies. This seems to more than double (from 66 to 153) the leadership total, and artificially reduces the percentage of former Guards.

Since the Administration has requested mostly military rather than "humanitarian" aid this year, and since, therefore, it is the military leaders of the contras who will be the actual recipients of the aid, I would appreciate precise and specific responses to the following questions about the military leadership of the FDN:

(1) Who served on the ten-member General Staff referred to in Ambassador Motley's letter last April, and who now holds their title or duty?

(2) Are nine of the ten-member General Staff still, as Ambassador Motley confirmed in the letter, former members of the National Guard?

(3) Is Walter "Tono" Calderon Lopez coordinating the regional commands as commander of theater operations? (For questions 3–9, if this individual is not serving in the position, where is he serving, if at all?)

(4) Is "El Venado" serving as G-1, General Staff commander for personnel?

(5) Is "El Toro" serving as G-2, General Staff commander for personnel?

(6) Is "Mike Lima" serving as G-3, General Staff commander for operations?

(7) Is Armando "El Policia" Lopez serving as G-4, General Staff commander for logistics?

(8) Is "El Invisible" serving as G-5, General Staff commander for logistics?

(9) Is Juan Gomez serving as commander of air operations?

(10) What is the current role in the FDN and whereabouts of Ricardo Lau, who press reports placed in contra camps as recently as last month?

(11) Who commands the 14 regional commands cited in your letter to Senator Lugar, and what is the name of each command?

(12) Who commands the 52 task forces cited in your letter to Senator Lugar, and what is the name of each task force?

(13) Who are the roughly 75 individuals tabulated in your letter to Senator Lugar who are neither General Staff, regional commanders or task force commanders, and what are their specific titles or duties?

(14) What are the positions and who are the occupants of the leadership posts referred to in the chart entitled "Background of FDN Military Leaders: Late 1985" that accompanied Secretary Shultz's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 27?

Biographical information on individuals you will be naming in your response would also be of use.

Since Congress will be voting on the aid request later this month, we would hope a response to these questions could be provided prior to March 11.

Thank you for your attention to this request.

  Document 3

Letter from Assistant Secretary Abrams to Senator Pell, March 14, 1986

Dear Senator Pell:

I agree fully that accurate information on the military leaders of the FDN is important to the debate over U.S. policy in Central America. I welcome the opportunity to answer your questions of March 4.

Let me first say, however, that our identifying 41 out of 153 members of the FDN senior personnel as former Guardsmen does not confirm the principal contention of the April 1985 Caucus staff report that the FDN "army is organized and commanded by former National Guardsmen."

Allowing for growth and force expansion, but counting the positions performing the same functions the Caucus report used to base its claim that 46 out of 48 were former Guardsmen, we found 29 former Guards out of 82 individuals whose backgrounds were identified. Thirty-five per cent is not the same as 96 per cent.

Who are the almost two thirds of the FDN's military leaders who are not former Guardsmen? In response to your inquiries, I am enclosing a list [see Document 6] of Senior FDN military personnel. It identifies their positions and their previous occupations, including discrepancies when they have come to our attention. It shows that a majority are civilians, that they come from both urban and rural backgrounds, and that many previously served in Sandinista army or militia units.

This brings me to a second key point: the resistance forces have grown steadily since 1982. This means that more people now joining were previously with the Sandinistas than with the Guard, which ceased to exist more than six years ago. It also means that the 4