Page:US Dept. of State - Documents on the Nicaraguan Resistance (1986).pdf/2

 Arturo Cruz, and Alfonso Robelo. All three actively opposed Somoza while he was still in power. Calero was jailed by Somoza; first Robelo then Cruz became Junta members with the Sandinistas.

The largest guerrilla forces belong to the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), headed by Calero since 1983. Other important resistance organizations include ARDE, built by Robelo and former Sandinista Comandante Eden Pastora, and MISURASATA and KISAN guerrillas active among the Indians of the Atlantic Coast.

We expect the UNO coalition to continue to broaden, both inside and outside of Nicaragua, but UNO is already far more representative of the wishes of the Nicaraguan people than Somoza ever was or than the Sandinistas are today.

Resistance fighters are overwhelmingly rural youths. Most are between 18 and 22 years old; when Somoza fell in 1979, they were in their early teens. They fight today in response to Sandinista attempts to control their farming, their churches, and in some cases their indigenous cultures. Many joined the resistance in preference to being drafted to fight for the Sandinistas against their friends and neighbors. In defending their families and communities, these young Nicaraguans are fighting for self-determination above all else. Their struggle is not on behalf of the old dictatorship—it is against the new dictatorship armed by Cuba and the Soviet Union.

The commanders are older than their troops (most are 25–35), are more likely to come from urban areas, and have more diverse occupations and backgrounds. They include both former National Guardsmen and former Sandinista fighters, but most are civilians from the very groups the Sandinistas claim to represent: peasants, small-farmers, urban professionals, and students. One was a primary school teacher; another. an evangelical pastor. Even in the FDN, which has the largest number of former military professionals, less than half the commanders have prior military experience, either in the National Guard under Somoza or in the army, militia, or security services under the Sandinistas.

We have obtained information on the backgrounds of all senior FDN military leaders, including the incumbents of every position from the civil-military command down to task force deputy commander or executive officer. The results, based on a November 1985 survey, are summarized in Table I, below. Allowing for casualties, transfers, and other personnel changes, we believe that this general pattern holds today.

While accepting that most FDN fighters are peasants, a report prepared last year for the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus (Who are the Contras?, April 18, 1985) claimed that the FDN "army is organized and commanded by former National Guardsmen." This allegation, though false, has become almost an article of faith for many who oppose U.S. support for the Nicaraguan resistance.

The Caucus staff claimed that "46 of the 48 positions in the FDN's command structure are held by former Guardsmen." "[A]ll but one of the 12 top central staff" and "five out of six regional commanders, and all 30 task force commanders" were said to be Guardsmen.

The Caucus staff is correct in identifying the FDN's military commander, Enrique Bermudez, as a former Guard officer. It is also correct in describing the FDN's regional and task force commanders as "the key military field leaders." But the report's overall figures and conclusions are incorrect.

The FDN has 14 regional commands (each has roughly 800 combatants organized into 2 to 4 task forces). At the time of the survey, the FDN had 52 task forces or equivalent commands (task forces have from 60 to 700 members). Tables II and III show the backgrounds of the regional and task force commanders. They are based on the same data as Table I.

Rather than 5 of 6 regional commanders being former Guard members as asserted in the Caucus report, we find 3 of 14.

Whereas the Caucus report claimed that 30 out of 30 task force commanders were former Guardsmen, we find that 14 out of 47 did have prior Guard service, but that 33, more than twice as many, never served in the Guard in any capacity.

FDN headquarters links the strong willed and independent field commanders who control the troops with the UNO political leadership. The Caucus claim of 11 former Guardsmen in 12 top positions omitted several positions held by persons who were not former Guardsmen. A complete count must include all members of the strategic and civil-military commands, all operational commanders, and all chiefs of support services. Of the 21 individuals in these positions late last year, 12 (including Bermudez) once served in the Guard. A former Sandinista Army officer and eight civilians from professional or tech 2