Page:U.S. ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu.pdf/16

Rh The same analysis applies here. According to petitioners, respondents received notice that the phrase “usual and customary” referred to their discounted prices (in some cases, it seems, from the same entities to which they reported their prices). And, according to petitioners, respondents comprehended those notices and then tried to hide their discounted prices. If that is true, then perhaps respondents actually knew what the phrase meant; or perhaps respondents were aware of an unjustifiably high risk that the phrase referred to their discounted prices. And, if that is true, then respondents may have known that their claims were false. The facial ambiguity of the phrase thus does not by itself preclude a finding of scienter under the FCA.

Second, like the Seventh Circuit, respondents rely on Safeco. They contend that Safeco already interpreted the common-law definitions of “knowing” and “reckless” and that it did so by looking first at whether the defendant’s “reading of the statute” was “objectively unreasonable.” 551 U. S., at 69. Accordingly, respondents conclude that, because the FCA has the same common-law terms, it should be read with the same, objective common-law focus.

This argument fails twice over. First, Safeco interpreted a different statute, the FCRA, which had a different mens rea standard, “ ‘willfully.’ ” Id., at 52 (quoting 15 U. S. C. §1681n(a)). While Safeco did reference the common law’s standards for “knowing” and “reckless” conduct, see 551 U. S., at 59–60, 68–69, its interpretation was ultimately tied to the FCRA’s particular text. To take Safeco as establishing categorical rules for those terms would accordingly “abandon the care we have traditionally taken to construe such words in their particular statutory context.” Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L. P. A., 559 U. S. 573, 585 (2010). And, as explained above, the FCA’s scienter standards are plainly satisfied by a defendant’s