Page:U.S. ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu.pdf/13

10 ibid. And here, the FCA’s definition of “knowingly” confirms that assumption by largely tracking the common-law scienter standards for fraud.

On their face and at common law, the FCA’s standards focus primarily on what respondents thought and believed. First, the term “actual knowledge” refers to whether a person is “aware of ” information. See Intel Corp. Investment Policy Comm. v. Sulyma, 589 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2020) (slip op., at 6–7); Escobar, 579 U. S., at 191 (“A defendant can have ‘actual knowledge’ that a condition is material without the Government expressly calling it a condition of payment”); Black’s Law Dictionary 784 (5th ed. 1979) (“to understand,” or “the perception of the truth”); Restatement (Second) of Torts §526, and Comment c. Second, the term “deliberate ignorance” encompasses defendants who are aware of a substantial risk that their statements are false, but intentionally avoid taking steps to confirm the statement’s truth or falsity. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S. A., 563 U. S. 754, 769 (2011); Black’s Law Dictionary, at 672 (“[v]oluntary ignorance”); Derry, 14 App. Cas., at 376. And, third, the term “reckless disregard” similarly captures defendants who are conscious of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that their claims are false, but submit the claims anyway. See Black’s Law Dictionary, at 1142; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825, 836 (1994); Restatement (Third) of Torts §10, Comment c.