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Rh §3729(b)(1)(A)(iii). In short, either actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or recklessness will suffice.

That three-part test largely tracks the traditional common-law scienter requirement for claims of fraud. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §526 (1976); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm §10 (2018). For example, one widely cited English decision, Derry v. Peek, [1889] 14 App. Cas., articulated the rule as follows: “[F]raud is proved when it is shewn that a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false.” Id., at 374 (judgment of Lord Herschell). And, capturing the FCA’s use of the term “deliberate ignorance,” that decision noted that an action for fraud would lie if “a person making a false statement had shut his eyes to the facts, or purposely abstained from inquiring into them.” Id., at 376. Those standards have been cited and widely adopted by American courts in the century since. See 3 D. Dobbs, P. Hayden, & E. Bublick, Law of Torts §665, p. 645 (2d ed. 2011) (Dobbs); Restatement (Second) of Torts, App. §526, Reporter’s Note.

That the text of the FCA tracks the common law is unsurprising because, as we have recognized, the FCA is largely a fraud statute. See Escobar, 579 U. S., at 187–188, and n. 2. Indeed, the FCA was first enacted in 1863 to “ ‘sto[p] the massive frauds perpetrated by large contractors during the Civil War.’ ” Id., at 181. To this day, the FCA refers to “ ‘false or fraudulent’ ” claims, pointing directly to “the common-law meaning of fraud.” Id., at 187 (emphasis added). In the absence of statutory text to the contrary, we would assume that “ ‘Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning’ ” of such a common-law term. See