Page:U.S. ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources.pdf/6

2 courts should use in deciding whether to grant a Government motion to dismiss.

Today, we hold that the Government may seek dismissal of an FCA action over a relator’s objection so long as it intervened sometime in the litigation, whether at the outset or afterward. We also hold that in handling such a motion, district courts should apply the rule generally governing voluntary dismissal of suits: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a).

The FCA dates to the Civil War, when a Congressional committee uncovered “stupendous abuses” in the sale of provisions and munitions to the War Department. H. R. Rep. No. 2, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. II (1861). Testimony before Congress “painted a sordid picture of how the United States had been billed for nonexistent or worthless goods, charged exorbitant prices for goods delivered, and generally robbed in purchasing the necessities of war.” United States v. McNinch, 356 U. S. 595, 599 (1958). To put a stop to the plunder—and more generally, to “protect the funds and property of the Government”—Congress enacted the FCA. Rainwater v. United States, 356 U. S. 590, 592 (1958). The Act, then as now, imposed civil liability for many deceptive practices meant to appropriate government assets.

From the start, the FCA has been enforced through a unique public-private scheme. Federal prosecutors may of course sue an alleged violator, all on their own. See 31 U. S. C. §3730(a). But private parties—again, relators—may also sue, in so-called qui tam actions. Those suits are “brought in the name of the Government.” §3730(b)(1).