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8 Article II and that private relators may not represent the interests of the United States in litigation. Because “[t]he entire ‘executive Power’ belongs to the President alone,” Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 11), it can only be exercised by the President and those acting under him, see id., at ___ (slip op., at 2) (, concurring in part and dissenting in part). And, as “[a] lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the law,” the Court has held that “conducting civil litigation … for vindicating public rights” of the United States is an “executive functio[n]” that “may be discharged only by persons who are ‘Officers of the United States’ ” under the Appointments Clause, Art. II, §2, cl. 2. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 138–140 (1976) (per curiam) (some internal quotation marks omitted). A private relator under the FCA, however, is not “appointed as an officer of the United States” under Article II. Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. ''United States ex rel. Hunt'', 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 8). It thus appears to follow that Congress cannot authorize a private relator to wield executive authority to represent the United States’ interests in civil litigation.

The potential inconsistency of qui tam suits with Article II has been noticed for decades. See, e.g., Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital, 252 F. 3d 749, 758–775 (CA5 2001) (en banc) (Smith, J., dissenting); J. Blanch, Note, The Constitutionality of the False Claims Act’s Qui Tam Provision, 16 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 701, 736–767 (1993); Constitutionality of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, 13 Op. OLC 207, 221–224, 228–232 (1989). The primary counterargument has emphasized the long historical pedigree of qui tam suits, including the fact that the First Congress passed a handful of qui tam statutes. See, e.g., Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. ''United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 801 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Riley'', 252 F. 3d, at 752–753 (“[H]istory alone resolves … whether the qui tam provisions in the FCA violate Article II”).