Page:U.S. ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources.pdf/27

Rh

, dissenting.

In my view, the text and structure of the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U. S. C. §§3729–3733, afford the Government no power to unilaterally dismiss a pending qui tam action after it has “decline[d] to take over the action” from the relator at its outset. §3730(b)(4)(B). Thus, I would vacate the judgment below and remand for the Third Circuit to consider the serious constitutional questions that may affect the disposition of the Government’s motion to dismiss petitioner’s qui tam suit. Because the Court instead affirms, I respectfully dissent.

The FCA provides that private parties known as relators may bring qui tam suits “for [themselves] and for the United States Government.” §3730(b)(1). It then sets out a reticulated scheme to govern the initiation of a qui tam suit, see §3730(b); the parties’ procedural rights during the suit, see §3730(c); and the rights of the parties to any proceeds at the end of the suit, see §3730(d). See also,. The main structural feature of this scheme is the so-called seal period: a window of time at the start of every FCA qui tam action during which the suit is on hold and the Government must “elect” whether “to intervene and