Page:U.S. ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources.pdf/18

14 proposes a complicated form of arbitrary-and-capricious review, with a burden-shifting component. But again, the Third Circuit’s Goldilocks position is the legally right one. A district court should assess a (2)(A) motion to dismiss using Rule 41’s standards. And in most FCA cases, as the Court of Appeals suggested, those standards will be readily satisfied. See 17 F. 4th, at 390–391, and n. 18.

The reason for alighting on Rule 41 is not complicated: The Federal Rules are the default rules in civil litigation, and nothing warrants a departure from them here. As Rule 1 states: “These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts” (with specified exceptions not relevant here). Of course, Congress may override that command when it wishes. But we do not lightly infer that Congress has done so; and silence on the subject is seldom enough. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U. S. 199, 212 (2007); Marek v. Chesny, 473 U. S. 1, 11–12 (1985). Here, nothing in the FCA suggests that Congress meant to except qui tam actions from the usual voluntary dismissal rule. To the contrary, the FCA’s many cross-references to the Rules suggest that their application is the norm. See, e.g., §3732(a) (requiring that a summons in an FCA action comply with the Rules); §§§ [sic]3730(b)(2)–(3) (requiring service to the Government and defendant “pursuant to Rule 4”). And this Court has made clear that various Rules not specifically mentioned—in particular, those dealing with discovery—also apply. See Eisenstein, 556 U. S., at 933–934. As a practical matter, the Federal Rules apply in FCA litigation in courts across the country every day. There is no reason to make an exception for the one about voluntary dismissals.

The application of Rule 41 in the FCA context will differ in two ways from the norm. The first pertains to procedure. The FCA requires notice and an opportunity for a hearing before a Subparagraph (2)(A) dismissal can take place. So the district court must use that procedural framework to