Page:Two Introductory Lectures on the Science of International Law.djvu/30

 the philosopher of Delft, and pointed out that he professedly invokes the writers of by-gone days, not as judges who have decided, but as witnesses who may assist the judgment of the reader.

“He quotes them, as he tells us himself, as witnesses whose conspiring testimony, mightily strengthened and confirmed by their discordance on almost every other subject, is a conclusive proof of the unanimity of the whole human race on the great rules of duty and the fundamental principles of morals. On such matters poets and orators are the most unexceptionable of all witnesses; for they address themselves to the general feelings and sympathies of mankind, and they are neither warped by system, nor perverted by sophistry. They can attain none of their objects,—they can neither please nor pursuade,—if they dwell on moral sentiments not in unison with those of their readers. No system of moral philosophy can surely disregard the general feelings of human nature and the according judgment of all ages and nations. But where are these feelings and that judgment recorded and preserved? In those very writings which Grotius is gravely blamed for having quoted. The usages and laws of nations, the events of history, the opinions of philosophers, the sentiments of orators and poets, as well as the observation of common life, are in truth the materials out of which the science of morality is formed; and those who neglect them are justly chargeable with a vain attempt to philosophise without regard to fact and experience, the sole foundation of all true philosophy.”

The passage in Grotius, which has suggested this defence, is found in the Prolegomena, where Grotius says:—