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16 those who had abetted the underlying tort through conscious, “culpable conduct.” Camp, 948 F. 2d, at 460.

Halberstam’s framework reflected and distilled those common-law principles. Indeed, Halberstam started with a survey of many earlier common-law cases, including many of the same cases cited above. 705 F. 2d, at 477, 483 (citing, e.g., Woodward, 522 F. 2d, at 94–95; Landy, 486 F. 2d, at 162–163; Duke, 245 Md., at 457–458, 226 A. 2d, at 347). As part of that survey, Halberstam explicitly distinguished different types of aid along the same culpability axis that grounded the common law. 705 F. 2d, at 481–483. For example, Halberstam recognized that giving verbal encouragement (such as yelling “ ‘Kill him!’ ”) could be substantial assistance, id., at 481, but that passively watching an assault after hearing an assailant threaten the victim likely would not be, id., at 483. Those same lines have long been drawn for aiding-and-abetting liability under the common law. See Rosemond, 572 U. S., at 70; see also, e.g., 2 LaFave §13.2(a), at 457–460; Restatement (Second) of Torts §876, Comment d, Illus. 9–10, at 318; Brown, 83 Mass., at 98. And Halberstam’s six factors for “substantial assistance” call for the same balancing that courts had undertaken previously between the nature and amount of assistance on the one hand and the defendant’s scienter on the other. 705 F. 2d, at 484–485, 487–488.

Despite that deep-rooted common-law basis, the Ninth Circuit appears to have understood JASTA’s approval of Halberstam’s “legal framework” as requiring it to hew tightly to the precise formulations that Halberstam used. The parties before us similarly make a conscious effort to draw analogies to the facts of that case. But any approach that too rigidly focuses on Halberstam’s facts or its exact phraseology risks missing the mark. Halberstam is by its own terms a common-law case and provided its elements