Page:Twitter v. Taamneh.pdf/2

2 for failure to state a claim, but the Ninth Circuit reversed.

(i) In Halberstam, the D. C. Circuit undertook an extensive survey of the common law with respect to aiding and abetting and synthesized the surveyed cases as resting on three main elements: (1) there must be a wrongful act causing an injury performed by the person whom the defendant aided; (2) at the time assistance was provided, the defendant must have been “generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity;” and (3) the defendant must have “knowingly and substantially assist[ed] the principal violation.” 705 F. 2d, at 477. The court then articulated six factors to help determine whether a defendant’s assistance was “substantial.” They are (1) “the nature of the act assisted,” (2) the “amount of assistance” provided, (3) whether the defendant was “present at the time” of the principal tort, (4) the defendant’s “relation to the tortious actor,” (5) the “defendant’s state of mind,” and (6) the “duration of the assistance” given. Id., at 488 (emphasis deleted). Halberstam also clarified that those who aid and abet “a tortious act may be liable” not only for the act itself but also “for other reasonably foreseeable acts done in connection with it.” Id., at 484. Finally, the court warned that its formulations should “not