Page:Twentieth Century Impressions of Hongkong, Shanghai, and other Treaty Ports of China.djvu/84

76 the allied powers. Sir Hope Grant, a distinguished Anglo-Indian general, who had done good service in the operations around Canton, commanded the British forces, while General Montauban was at the head of the French contingent. The naval command on the British side remained in the hands of Admiral Hope. The diplomatic arrangements were in harmony with the size and importance of the expedition. Mr. Bruce, who had continued to represent the British Government, and, indeed, on the 8th of March presented the ultimatum embodying the demands of the British Government, was superseded by his brother, Lord Elgin, and the French Government again sent out Baron Gros to represent them. Nothing this time was to be left to chance. The instruction given to the plenipotentiaries was to demand an indemnity equivalent to five millions for the losses inflicted upon the two countries by the non-ratification of the Treaty. A reply sent by the Chinese Government to Mr. Bruce's ultimatum clearly showed that there was not the smallest chance of securing peacefully the acceptance of the stipulated conditions. A blank refusal was given to the demand for an indemnity and an apology, and while it was intimated that the British might perhaps be allowed to proceed to Peking by way of Pehtang, it was at the same time announced that in no circumstances would the use of the route by Taku and the Peiho be permitted. It was probably never anticipated that the Peking authorities would make other than an unfavourable reply. At all events, the military preparations were continued without a break as soon as the word had been given for the despatch of the expedition. In view of the advent of the very large body of troops forming the expeditionary force, a lease was obtained in perpetuity of Kowloon and Stonecutter Island, positions which from their greater openness of situation were far more healthy than the island of Hongkong. Here the troops on arrival from India or England were received, and as the summer advanced an imposing and inspiriting spectacle was presented by the various camps. The first move, one which excited a good deal of criticism then and afterwards, was the occupation of Chusan by a body of two thousand British troops. The island was not subsequently used to any appreciable extent in the conduct of the operations, and its capture had not the smallest influence on the course of the operations. The really important centre at this juncture was the mouth of the Peiho, where there was a very nasty reverse to be avenged and the conviction to be carried to the headquarters of the Chinese power that Treaty rights must be respected. Thither by-degrees the allied forces were despatched, Shanghai being made an advanced base. There was considerable delay due to differences of opinion between the British and French commanders as to the plan of campaign. Eventually, about a year after the failure of Admiral Hope's effort to force the passage of the river, all was in readiness for the execution of a plan mutually agreed upon to attack and capture Pehtang and take the Taku forts in the rear. The troops, who were led by Sir Hope Grant in person, effected a landing without opposition, and they bivouacked for the night on an elevated causeway near the shore. A reconnaissance the next morning showed that the enemy had evacuated the fort which guarded the spot, but they had thoughtfully left a mine to be exploded by the moving of some, which were placed where they were certain to be trodden upon by the incoming troops. Fortunately the trick was exposed in time, with the result that the trap was avoided. Pushing into the country after three days of inaction, reconnoitring parties came across a strongly entrenched Chinese camp, from which a heavy fire was opened, compelling the British to withdraw. As this camp commanded the road leading to the interior it was obvious that it must be carried, but the position presented very considerable difficulties to an attacking force, owing to the circumstance that the country all about was little better than a swamp. The discovery by Colonel (afterwards Lord) Wolseley of a cart track suitable for the passage of troops suggested the possibility of a flank movement and to some extent improved the situation. But with an enemy more enterprising than the Chinese the assault would have been a matter of great danger. As it was the obstacles proved so formidable that it seemed at one time that the movement would have to be abandoned or at least deferred. Describing the march subsequently. Sir Hope Grant wrote: "The horses got bogged, the guns sunk up to their axletrees, and the waggons stuck fast. At last we were compelled to leave the waggon bodies behind us, and content ourselves with the gun and waggon limbers." In the end, however, dogged persistence and pluck carried the day. The enemy's position was vigorously attacked on the flank as well as in front, and after a brief resistance the Chinese defenders broke and fled. But this fight was only a preliminary to another and more stubborn engagement. Beyond the village of Sinho, which the allied troops had captured, was the far more important position of Tangku, a strongly fortified village protected by well-placed batteries. An attack was made on this by the expeditionary force as soon as a careful reconnaissance had shown the most practicable line of advance. Thirty-six pieces of ordnance were brought to bear upon the fortifications, with the result that the Chinese fire was soon got under. But the defenders, contrary to the usual practice of the Chinese, still held their ground. Nor was it until the guns had been brought almost up to the walls and the men of the attacking force were streaming in that the evacuation was begun. The success at Tangku removed the last obstacle in the way of an attack on the Taku forts. The only question was whether attention should be directed first to the forts on the northern or to those on the southern side. Sir Hope Grant was in favour of an immediate attack on the northern defences, as in his view their capture would render the southern forts untenable. General Montauban took the view that the southern forts should be dealt with first, but he ultimately agreed to accept the plan of campaign proposed by his British colleague. On the 21st of August, after a series of careful reconnaissances, the attack opened with a brief