Page:Turkey, the great powers, and the Bagdad Railway.djvu/63

 Turkey might lead to pressure on the German Government to adopt an imperial policy in Asia Minor, as, indeed, German investments in Africa had forced him to enter colonial competition in the Dark Continent.[20] When the Deutsche Bank first called the Chancellor's attention to its Anatolian enterprises, therefore, Bismarck frankly stated his misgivings about the situation. In a letter to Dr. von Siemens, Managing Director of the Deutsche Bank, dated at the Foreign Office, September 2, 1888, he wrote:[21]

"With reference to the inquiry of the Deutsche Bank of the 15 ultimo, I beg to reply that no diplomatic objections exist to an application for a concession for railway construction in Asia Minor.

The Imperial Embassy at Constantinople has been authorized to lend support to German applicants for such concessions—particularly to the designated representative of the Deutsche Bank in Constantinople—in their respective endeavors in this matter.

The Board of Directors in its inquiry has correctly given expression to the assumption that any official endorsement of its plans, in the present state of affairs, would neither extend beyond the life of the concession nor apply to the execution and operation of the enterprise. As a matter of fact, German entrepreneurs assume a risk in capital investments in railway construction in Anatolia—a risk which lies, first, in the difficulties encountered in the enforcement of the law in the East, and, second, in the increase of such difficulties through war or other complications.

''The danger involved therein for German entrepreneurs must be assumed exclusively by the entrepreneurs, and the latter must not count upon the protection of the German Empire against eventualities connected with precarious enterprises in foreign countries.''"[22]

Bismarck disapproved of the visit of William II to Turkey in 1889. Failing to persuade the young Emperor to abandon the trip to Constantinople, the Chancellor did