Page:Turkey, the great powers, and the Bagdad Railway.djvu/306

 "political officer." In addition, General Delamain was to "take such military and political action as he should consider feasible to strengthen his position and, if necessary, occupy Basra." Nevertheless, he was warned that the rôle of his force was "that of demonstrating at the head of the Persian Gulf" and that on no account was he "to take any hostile action against the Turks without orders from the Government of India, except in the case of absolute military necessity"![12]

Meanwhile, Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, subsequently first High Commissioner in Egypt under the Protectorate, entered into an agreement, dated October 23, 1914, with the Sherif of Mecca, assuring the latter that Great Britain was prepared "to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs within territories in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France," it being understood that "the districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab." In other words, an independent Arab state was considered to be feasible insofar as it did not conflict with the sphere of interest in Syria developed by French railway-builders and recognized by the Franco-German agreement of February 15, 1914.[13]

Even before Turkey formally entered the war, therefore, a British army was "demonstrating" in the Shatt-el-Arab; Sir Percy Cox was coöperating with the Sheik of Koweit for the purpose of precipitating a rebellion among the Arabs of Mesopotamia, and a British representative had sown the seeds of a separatist movement in the Hedjaz. It was a short step from this, after the declaration of hostilities, to the occupation of Basra, on November 22, and of Kurna, on December 9. The close of the year 1914 saw Turkey in the unenviable position