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 the commanding strategic position was the Straits. The capture of Constantinople would win the war.[10]

There were others who considered that a purely defensive policy should be followed in the Near East. Lord Kitchener, for example, believed in concentrating the maximum possible man power in France and advocated restricting Eastern operations to the protection of the Suez Canal and other essential communications. Influential military critics, like Colonel Repington, were firmly opposed to "side shows" in Mesopotamia, at the Dardanelles, or elsewhere, which would divert men, matériel, and popular attention from the Western Front. Sir Edward Grey appeared to be more interested in Continental than in colonial questions. Lord Curzon was swayed between fear of a Moslem uprising in India and the hope that British prestige in the East might be materially enhanced by outstanding military successes at the expense of the Turks.[11]

The Near Eastern imperialists, however, had their way. During September, 1914, the Government of India was ordered to prepare an expeditionary force for service in the region of the Persian Gulf. Early in October, almost four weeks before Turkey entered the war, Indian Expeditionary Force "D," under General Delamain, sailed from Bombay under sealed orders. It next appeared on October 23, at Bahrein Island, in the Persian Gulf, where General Delamain learned the purposes of the expedition which he commanded. His army was to occupy Adaban Island, at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, "with the object of protecting the oil refineries, tanks and pipe lines [of the Anglo-Persian Company], covering the landing of reënforcements should these be required, and assuring the local Arabs of support against Turkey." For the last-named purpose Sir Percy Cox, subsequently British High Commissioner in Irak, was attached to the army as