Page:Turkey, the great powers, and the Bagdad Railway.djvu/254

 transferred, in case of need, to another. All in all, the peasantry were developing qualities of industry, thrift, and adaptability which seemed to forecast great things for the future of Asia Minor.[17]

Furthermore, the German railways in Turkey, the failure of which had been freely prophesied, proved to be successful business enterprises. The directors took all possible steps to build up the earning power of the lines, rather than depend upon the minimum return guaranteed by the Ottoman Government. The railways were efficiently and intelligently administered—the operating expenses of the Anatolian and Bagdad lines never exceeded 47% of the gross receipts, although the operating expenses of the chief European railways, under much more favorable conditions, varied from 54% to 62% of gross receipts during the same period. Occasional dividends of 5% or 6% were paid by the Anatolian and Bagdad Railway Companies between 1906 and 1914, but only when the disbursements were warranted by earnings. In 1911, a notable advance was made by the introduction of oil-*burning locomotives on the Bagdad lines; henceforth the German railways in Turkey were operated with fuel purchased from the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey![18]

This scrupulously careful management eventually brought its reward. In 1911, the earnings of the Angora line exceeded the kilometric guarantee and, in accordance with the terms of the concession, the Ottoman Government received a share of the receipts. In 1912, the returns of the Eski Shehr-Konia line also exceeded the sum guaranteed by the Government, the Ottoman Treasury receiving a share of the earnings of the Anatolian system to an amount of more than $200,000. After 1913, no further payments to the Anatolian Railway Company were required under the kilometric guarantees.[19]