Page:Turkey, the great powers, and the Bagdad Railway.djvu/250

 expressed a willingness, furthermore, to confer with representatives of France and Great Britain for the purpose of satisfying the legitimate political demands of those two nations in Syria and Mesopotamia. The following day, nevertheless, Sir Edward Grey informed the House of Commons that His Majesty's Government was not prepared to consent to an increase in the Turkish customs duties, because it was not clear that the Ottoman Government was ready to guarantee adequate protection to British commercial interests in Mesopotamia and the region of the Persian Gulf.[11]

This decision was received in Constantinople with undisguised animosity. Young Turks were as little disposed to tolerate British, as they were French, supervision of Ottoman finances and economic policies. The press roundly denounced the British and said that once again Turkey had been shown the wisdom of friendship for Germany.[12]

Entente actions were contrasted with the more conciliatory policy of the Germans. As early as November, 1910, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein had notified the Sublime Porte that Germany would place no obstacles in the way of an increase in the Ottoman customs duties and that, furthermore, his Government was prepared to urge that the Anatolian and Bagdad Railway Companies forego any additional assignment of Turkish revenues. During the first week of March, 1911, Dr. von Gwinner and Dr. Helfferich informed the Ottoman Government that the Bagdad Railway Company was willing to abandon its right to construct the sections of the line from Bagdad to Basra and the Persian Gulf, including the concessions for port and terminal facilities at Basra. The Turkish Government was to be given a free hand as to the disposition of the portion of the railway beyond Bagdad, with the single reservation that the Deutsche Bank should be awarded a share in the enterprise equal to that granted