Page:Turkey, the great powers, and the Bagdad Railway.djvu/226

 Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 already had ended the British policy of aloofness, and there appeared to be no sound reason against the negotiation of other treaties which similarly would strengthen the British position in the East. The Bagdad Railway negotiations collapsed, but the agreement with France—which seemed far more difficult of achievement—was consummated without further delay. Three years later, in 1907, Great Britain came to an agreement with another of her rivals in the East—Russia. The Tsar, chastened by military defeat abroad and by revolution at home, recognized a British sphere of interest in Persia, relinquished all claims in Afghanistan, and acknowledged the suzerainty of China over Tibet.[39] The understanding with France had assured the safety of the Suez Canal from an attack from the Sudan; the agreement with Russia removed the menace of an attack upon India from the north and northwest. Germany became Great Britain's only formidable rival in the Near East.

Thus the Germans found themselves facing a powerful diplomatic obstacle to the construction of the Bagdad Railway. Here was another instance, in their minds, of the "encirclement" of Germany by a hostile coalition—an "encirclement" not only on the Continent, but in a German sphere of imperial interest as well. A conspicuous German Oriental scholar said that the attitude of the other European powers toward the Bagdad Railway was the best proof of their enmity toward Germany. "Every single kilometre had to be fought for against the unyielding opposition of Great Britain, Russia, and France, who desired to frustrate any increase in the power of Turkey. Great Britain led and organized this opposition because she feared that India and Egypt were threatened by the Bagdad Railway." If one wishes to understand the diplomatic history of the War, "he needs