Page:Turkey, the great powers, and the Bagdad Railway.djvu/173

 *possessed of capital for the purpose—should dominate the transportation system of Asiatic Turkey.[6]

It is questionable, however, if the Bagdad Railway really threatened any important Russian economic interests. The railways of southern Russia, so far from being injured by competition with the proposed new railways of Turkey, would be almost certain to profit from any increase of trade in the region of the Black Sea. The Russian dream of a railway to Alexandretta was still very much of a dream; but even if the contrary had been the case, its construction for peaceful purposes would not have been hindered by the Bagdad plan. The claim that a trans-Mesopotamian railway would compete with the Far Eastern traffic of the Siberian Railways was purely fantastic; it overlooked the obvious fact that an ideal shipping route, like a straight line, is the shortest distance between two points. It would be at least a generation before Mesopotamian grain and oil could play a prominent part in the Russian market.[7]

But with Russian political interests the case was different. Ever since the days of Peter the Great, the Russian Tsars had persistently and relentlessly continued their efforts to obtain a "window" on the Mediterranean. This historical trend toward the open sea led to a well-defined intention on the part of Russia, in one way or another, to take Constantinople from the Turks. The dynastic interests of Russia were reënforced by commercial considerations. "Most of Russia's southern trade is bound to pass through the Bosporus. Her wheat and hides, her coal and oil cannot reach the European markets any other way; her manganese and petroleum are inaccessible to other nations if they cannot find an outlet from the Caucasus to the Dardanelles." During the Turco-Italian War the closing of the Straits for a few days was said to have cost Russian shipping about eight million francs.[8]