Page:Turkey, the great powers, and the Bagdad Railway.djvu/172

 the nationals of one Power would be certain to control the administration of the enterprise. The Tsar was determined that Russian capitalists should have nothing to do with the Railway; Russian capital, for a time at least, should be conserved for industrial development at home. "The Government of Russia," he concluded, "is more interested in devoting its available resources to the construction of new railways within the Empire than it is in promoting an enterprise destined to offer competition to Russia's railways and industries."[4] In 1902 and again in 1903, M. Witte made similar statements, asserting that he saw no reason for changing his point of view.[5]

Witte's words carried weight in Russia. As an erstwhile railway worker he knew the great economic importance of railways. During his régime as Minister of Finance (1893-1903) an average of 1,400 miles of rails was laid down annually in Russia; the Transcaspian and Transcaucasian systems were constructed, and the Siberian Railway was pushed almost to completion. He foresaw that one day these railways would be powerful weapons in the commercial and political expansion of an industrialized Russia. As an official in charge of troop movements during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 he had learned to understand the function of railways in offensive and defensive warfare. Although he considered it wasteful to construct railways for military purposes alone, he believed that every railway was of strategic value; in fact, he looked upon railways as the most important single factor in national preparedness. As the foremost protagonist of Russia's tariff war with the German Empire he was opposed to any plan which promised to promote German commerce and to open up new resources and new markets to German industry. As a native of the Caucasus region and as an ardent advocate of colonial expansion Witte looked forward to the time when Russia herself—*