Page:Trump v. Raffensperger (S21M0561) (2020) Order.pdf/2

 of those exceptions. See OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (2)–(13) (setting out directly appealable non-final orders).

Additionally, petitioners’ reliance on the collateral order doctrine is unavailing. See Duke, 306 Ga. at 174. Furthermore, to the extent petitioners challenge the authority of the superior court judge to preside over the pending matter, it does not appear that any order has been entered on the challenge to her authority that they represent has been filed below, and thus this issue provides no basis for invoking the Court’s jurisdiction. See Titelman v. Stedman, 277 Ga. 460, 461 (591 SE2d 774) (2003) (order is not appealable until written, signed by judge, and filed with the clerk).

Finally to the extent that petitioners seek original relief, petitioners have not shown that this is one of those extremely rare cases that would invoke our original jurisdiction. See generally Brown v. Johnson, 251 Ga. 436 (306 SE2d 655) (1983). Accordingly for all these reasons, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition and dismisses it.

Melton, C. J., Nahmias, P. J., and Boggs, Peterson, Warren, Bethel, Ellington, and McMillian, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA Clerk's Office, Atlanta

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Supreme Court of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year above written.

Clerk