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701 the selfish;' still each man loves himself better than any other single person, 487: a source of justice, 487 f., 494, 500; contradiction between the extensive sympathy, which is the source of our sentiments of morals, and the limited generosity, which is natural to man, and the source of justice, removed by general rules, 586; self-love, 480.

Sensation (v. Feeling)—opposed to reasoning, 89; probable reasoning nothing but a species of sensation, 103; confusion between, and judgment in vision, 112; 'tis not the present sensation or momentary pain or pleasure which determines the character of any passion, but the general bent or tendency of it from beginning to end, 385; all except philosophers imagine 'that those actions of the mind are the same which produce not a different sensation,' 417; our own sensations determine the vice and virtue of any quality as well as those sensations which it may excite in others, 597 (cf. 469 f.).

Sense—moral, the source of moral distinctions, 470 f. (v. Moral, § 2); a very plausible hypothesis that the source of all sentiments of virtue is 'a certain sense which acts without reflection, and regards not the tendencies of actions and qualities,' 612.

Senses—scepticism with regard to, 187 f. (v. Scepticism, § 1); cannot tell us of continued existence of perceptions for that would mean that they operate when they have ceased to operate, 188; nor of their distinct existence, neither as models of impressions (q.v.), since they convey to us nothing but a single perception, and never give as the least intimation of anything beyond, 189, nor by an illusion, since all sensations are felt by the mind as they really are, 189, 190 (cf. Appearance); also to present our impressions as distinct from ourselves the senses would have to present both the impressions and ourselves at the same time, 189; whereas it is very doubtful how far we ourselves are the object of our senses, 190 (v. Identity, § 4); as a matter of fact the senses only present impressions as external to our body, which is not the same as external to ourselves, 191; again sight does not really inform us of distance or outness, but reason, 191; three kinds of impressions conveyed by, 192 (v. Impressions); so far as the senses are judges all perceptions are the same in the manner of their existence, 193; 'founded on imagination or the vivacity of our ideas,' 265; require continual correction, and we could have no language or conversation 'did we not correct the momentary appearances of things and overlook our present situation, 582, 603; appearances of, corrected by the understanding, 632 (cf. 189).

Sensible—proof, opposed to demonstrative, 449.

Shaftesbury, 254.

Simplicity—supposed, of bodies leads to fiction of substance, 219.

Society (v. Justice, § 2)—necessary to supply men's wants, 485; in