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700 destructive, though happily nature does not wait for that consummation, 187.

§ 2. With regard to the senses, 187 f.; just as the sceptic is compelled to reason and believe, so by nature he is compelled to assent to the existence of body (q.v.): 'it is vain to ask whether there be body or not,' 187; shows us (1) that the senses afford no justification for the belief in body, 188; (2) that this belief is the result of an illegitimate propensity of imagination, 193 f.; (3) that the philosophic system of a double existence of objects and perceptions is a monstrous offspring of two opposing systems, 313; (4) that the distinction between primary and secondary qualities destroys external objects altogether, and results in an extravagant scepticism, 228; moderate, of the true philosopher leads to the same indifference as the stupidity of the vulgar or the illusions of the false philosopher, 224.

§ 3. In general, 263 f.; the only criterion of truth, the only reason for assent to any opinion, is 'a strong propensity to consider objects in that view under which they appear to me;' this due to imagination worked on by experience and habit; memory, sense, and understanding all founded on imagination or the vivacity of our ideas 265; but imagination leads us to directly contrary opinions, 266, cf. 231; and yet we cannot rely solely on 'the understanding, that is, the general and more established principles of imagination,' for understanding alone entirely subverts itself, 267 (cf. 182 f.); we are saved from this total scepticism only by the week influence of abstruse reasonings on the imagination, 268 (cf. 185); yet we cannot reject all abstract reasoning—we have no choice but between a false reason and none at all,' 268; nature supplies the ordinary remedy of indifference, and my scepticism shows itself most perfectly in blind submission to senses and understanding, 269; we can only justify scepticism or philosophy by our inclination towards it; because 'I feel I should be a loser in point of pleasure if I did not pursue them,' 270; since we cannot rest content with every-day conversation and action, we ought only to deliberate about our choice of a guide, and choose the safest and most agreeable, viz. Philosophy, whose errors are only ridiculous and whose extravagances do not influence our lives, 271; all we want is a satisfactory set of opinions, and we are most likely to get them by studying human nature, 272; 'a true sceptic will be diffident of his philosophic doubts as well as of his philosophic convictions, and will never refuse any innocent satisfaction which offers itself upon account of either of them;' nor will he deny himself certainty in particular points, 273.

Scholastic—doctrine of free will, 313.

Self (v. Identity, § 4, Mind, Sympathy).

Selfishness—of man much over-estimated, since it is 'rare to meet any one in whom the kind affections taken together do not