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690 Poetry—120, 131; poetic fiction of golden age. 494; and history: poetical enthusiasm and serious conviction differ through reflection and general rules, 631.

Points—mathematical, reality of, 32; ideas of, 38; coloured and solid, 40; physical, 40; penetration of, 41; finite divisibility of, 44.

Political—artifice can never be the sole cause of the distinction we make between virtue and vice, 500, 533, 578, an only alter the direction of the passions, 521.

Politics—controversies in, 'incapable of any decision in most cases, and entirely subordinate to the interests of pence and liberty,' 562.

Possession—long, a title to government, 556; present, 503, 557; first, 505; =power of using a thing, 506.

Power (v. Cause, § 9); distinction between power and its exercise inadmissible, 172; but though 'in a philosophical way of thinking' frivolous, it yet obtains in the philosophy of our passions, 311; the distinction not based os scholastic doctrine of free will, 312; sense of, compared with false sensation of liberty, 314; =possibility or probability of an action as discovered by experience; =anticipation or expectation of its being done, 313; the power of riches to acquire property{=}}the anticipation or expectation of the actual acquirement, 315 (cf. 360).

Praise—and blame, nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love and hatred, 614.

Prejudice—produced, and yet can only be corrected by general rules, 146 f.

Prescription—and property, 508.

Pride and Humility, 277 f.

§ 1. A. are indirect violent impressions of reflection, 276; being simple and uniform are indefinable, 277; pure emotions in the soul, and so distinguished from love and hatred, which are always attended by a desire, 367.

B. have the same object, viz. self, 371; which cannot however be their cause, 278 (cf. 443); in their cause distinguish between the quality which operates and the subject on which it is placed, e.g. in a beautiful house, beauty is the quality, the house 'considered as a man's property or contrivance' is the subject, for the subject must be something related to us, 179 (cf. 290); they have self as their object by a natural and also original propety, 280; their causes are natural but not original, 281-3.

C. Every cause of pride by its peculiar qualities produces a separate pleasure: the subject is either part of ourselves or something nearly related to us, 285; the object is determined by an original natural instinct and is self; pride is a pleasant feeling, 286; hence the pession is derived from a double relation of impressions and ideas: the cause is related to the object, the sensation which the cause separately produces to the sensation of pride: the one idea is