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689 § 4. Only to be justified by 'the inclination which we feel towards employing ourselves after that manner,' 270; to be preferred as a guide in our speculations, for if it is just it only presents us with 'mild and moderate sentiments.' and if extravagant it is harmless, 271; errors in religion are dangerous, those in philosophy only ridiculous, 272.

Physical—and moral necessity, no distinction between, 171; physical and moral science, 175.

Pity—a secondary affection; arises from sympathy, 369; malice is pity reversed, 375; being painful is related to benevolence, which is pleasant, by similarity or correspondence of their impulses or direction, 381; a social passion, 491.

Place, 235 f. (v. Extension, § 3; Mind § 2).

Pleasure.

§ 1. and pain, a kind of impression to which no one attributes continued existence; they are regarded as 'merely perceptions,' 192; though just as involuntary and violent as other kinds: but they are not as constant as some others, 194; and though they have coherence it is 'of a somewhat different nature,' 195.

§ 2. and pain arlse originally in the soul or body, whichever you please to call it, 276 (cf. 324); the pleasure which we receive from praise arises through sympathy, 324; arises from sympathy alone which provides us with lively ideas, since every lively idea is agreeable, 353-4; and pain produce direct passions immediately, 276, 399, 438; 'good and evil, or in other words, pleasure and pain,' 439; and pain chief actuating principles of the human mind; without these we are in a great measure (cf. 439) incapable of passion or action, desire or volition, 574; why the pursuit of truth pleases, 448 f.; includes many different sensations, 472.

§ 3. and pain, 'if not the causes of virtue and vice at least inseparable from them,' 296; not only the necessary attendant but the essence of beauty, 299; and wit, 297 (cf. 590, 611); virtue and vice, a particular pleasure and pain excited by characters and actions considered generally, 472; moral distinctions depend entirely on certain peculiar sentiments of pain and pleasure excited by a mental quality in ourselves or others, 574; this pain or pleasure may arise from four different sources, 591; each of the virtues excites a different feeling in the spectator, 607; transition from pleasure to love easy, 605; the pleasure of approbation can be excited by a quality which is not entirely voluntary in the possessor, 609 (v. Moral § 2-4; Sympathy, § 3. A)

§ 4. The only justification of philosophy, curiosity, or ambition to know is, that 'I feel I should be a loser in point of pleasure if I did not gratify them,' 271; the most pleasant guide in our speculations to be preferred, 271.