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683 knowingly, between deliberately and casually, no forgiveness or repentance, 412; voluntariness of natural abilities and moral virtues compared, 608 f.; a mental quality need not be entirely voluntary in order to produce approbation in the spectator, 609; 'free will has no place with regard to the actions no more than the qualities of men'; 'it is not a just consequence that what is voluntary is free (cf. 407); 'our actions are more voluntary than our judgments, but we have not more liberty in the one than in the other,' 609.

Object.

§ 1. Distinguished from cause of pride and humility, 277, 286, 287, 304, 305, 55° (cf. 482); of love and hatred, 529, 551.

§ 2. (v. Body, Coherence, Constancy, Custom, Existence, § 3, Identity, Perception).

A. Experiences united by a common object which produces them, 140; animals cannot feel pride in external (q.v.) objects, 326; idea of self nothing without perception of other objects, and so compels us to turn our view to external objects, 340.

B. The question of the existence of external objects=the questionof the continued and distinct existence of perceptions, 188; the vulgar think that perceptions are their only objects, 195, 202, 206, 209, and yet some perceptions they regard as merely perceptions, others they regard as having continued and distinct existence, 192; this distinction due to imagination, 194, which leads us to mistake a succession of resembling impressions for an identical object, 205, 254; philosophers invent the double existence of objects and perceptions, 211 f.; but even if objects exist differently from perceptions you can never argue from the existence of the latter to that of the former, 212, still less to their resemblance, 216, 217; the modern distinction between primary and secondary qualities annihilates external objects and reduces us to a most extravagant scepticism concerning them, 226-251.

C. When external objects are felt they acquire a relation to a connected heap of perceptions which we call the mind, 207; 'no external object can make itself known to the mind immediately and without the interposition of an image or perception,' 'this table which now appears to me is only a perception,' 259; 'the idea of a perception and of an object cannot represent what are specifically different from one another,' we must either conceive an external object as a relation without a relative or make it the very same with an impression or perception, 241; hence whatever relations we can discover between objects will hold good between impressions, but not conversely, 242.

Obligation.

§ 1. Unintelligible without an antecedent morality, 462 n (cf.