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674 us a more lively idea of our own happiness, 315; against ourselves, 376; mixture of with hatred by means of relation through parallel directions, 380 f.

Man—his need of society, 485; 'man in general' not the cause but only the object of love and hatred, 481; no question of original goodness of man but only of his sagacity, 492; human nature composed of affections and understanding which are requisite in all its actions, 493; superior to animals (q.v.) chiefly by superiority of his reason, human nature the 'only science of man,' 273; a man is a bundle or collection of different perceptions, 252, 634 (v. Identity. § 4)

Material—cause, 171.

Mathematics—mathematiml points, nature of ideas of, 38 f.; definitions of, consistent with theory of indivisible parts of extension, though its demonstrations are inconsistent with it, 42; objects of, really exist because we have clear ideas of them, 45; demonstrations of geometry not properly so called, because founded on ideas which are not exact, 45 f., e.g. idea of perfect equality in geometry a fiction, 48; right lines, 49; plane surfaces, 50; inferior exactness of geometry to that of arithmetic and algebra, 71; value of geometry, 72; no mystery in ideas which are objects of mathematics since copied from impressions, 13; mathematical necessity depends on an act of the understanding, 166; demonstrations of only probable, especially when long, 180; subject to imagination, 198 (cf. 48).

Matter.

§ 1.—and force according to Cartesians,159; or substance, fiction to support the simplicity and identity of bodies, 219 f. (v. body); homogeneity of in Peripatetic philosophy, 221; implies powers of resistance, 564.

§ 2.—and mind (q.v.) 232 f.; the greater part of beings exist out of local relation to extended body, i.e. have no local conjunction with matter, 135; the materialists wrong in conjoining all thought with extension, as also are those who conjoin it with a simple indivisible substance, 239, as does Spinoza who supposes a unity of substance in which both thought and matter inhere, 241 (ctl 244).

—or motion as the cause of our perceptions, 246 f.; a priori no reason why matter should not cause thought, 247; as a matter of fact we find matter or motion has a constant conjunction with thought, 'since every one may perceive that the different dispositions of the body change his thoughts and sentiments,' 248; thus matter may be and is the cause of thought and perception, 248.

§ 3.—actions of, necessary, but only through a determination of the mind produced by constant union, 400; 'I do not ascribe to will that unintelligible necessity which is supposed to lie in matter, but ascribe to matter that intelligible quality, call it necessity or not,