Page:Treatise of Human Nature (1888).djvu/696

672 with public interest is the source of the moral approbation which attends that virtue,' 500; political artifice assists this approbation, but can never be the sole cause of the distinction we make between vice and virtue, 500, 533; education and interest in our reputation also assist, 501; 'though justice be artificial, the sense of its morality is natural,' 619.

§ 4. The vulgar definition of justice, 'a constant and perpetual will of giving every one his due,' supposes right and property independent of justice, which is absurd, 526-7; justice and injustice do not admit of gradations, therefore not naturally either virtuous or vicious, since 'all natural qualities run insensibly into each other,' 530; the laws of being universal and perfectly inflexible, can never be derived from nature, 532; government required to enforce justice, 535-538; both natural and civil, derived from conventions, 543; the moral obligation to, not so strong between states as between individuals. because the natural obligation is weaker, 569; differs from the natural virtues, because in them every single act is good, 579 (cf. 497).

Knowledge—opposed to probability, 69 f.; opposed to 'observation and experience,' 81, 87; defined as 'the assurance arising from the comparison of ideas,' as distinguished from that which arises from 'proofs,' i.e; arguments from cause and effect, and that which arise from probability or the calculation of chances, 104: from the assurance arising from memory, causation, and probability, 153; only four out of seven philosophical relations objects of knowledge and certainty, 70; three of these perceived by intuition, the fourth by mathematical reasoning, 73; but all knowledge degenerates into probability when we consider the fallibility of our faculties, 180 (v. Scepticism); of men superior to that of animals, 326.

Labour—division o, increases man's ability, 485; theory that a man has property in his labour, 505 n.

Language—arises from convention without promise, 490.

Law—implies doctrine of necessity which alone explains responsibility, 411; rules of justice may be called 'Laws of Nature; 484; laws of nature invented by man, 520, 526, 543; positive, a title to government, 561; laws of nations and of nature, 567.

Liberty (v. Necessity), 400 f.; madmen have no liberty, 404; can only=chance, 407; confusion between liberty of spontaneity and liberty of indifference, 'between that which is opposed to violence and that which means a negation of necessity and causes,' 407; false sensation of liberty: fallacious experiment to prove it, 408; the doctrine of, and religion, 409; and choice, 461 n; 'it is not a just consequence that what is voluntary is free,' 609.